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To the Honorable Judges of the Utah Court of Appeals: 
Pursuant to the provisions of Rule 35 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Pro-Tech 
Restoration dba Stone Carpets (hereinafter "Pro-Tech"), the above-named appellee, respectfully 
petitions the court to grant a rehearing and reconsideration of the appeal in the above-entitled 
cause. In support of this Petition, appellee represents to the court as follows: 
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
A. Prior to trial, plaintiff filed a motion to limit the number of defendants' 
peremptory challenges. The court denied plaintiffs motion, finding diverse interests between 
the defendants, allowing plaintiff and each defendant three peremptory challenges to the main 
panel and each party one peremptory challenge as to the alternate juror. 
B. Following an adverse jury decision, on September 1, 1993, plaintiff filed a Motion 
for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict (Rule 50) and Motion for New Trial (Rule 59). In 
her memorandum in support, plaintiff did not assert as a basis for a new trial that the trial judge 
had erred in granting each defendant separate peremptory challenges nor the denial of her 
Motion to Limit Defendants' Peremptory Challenges. 
Plaintiff also filed a reply memorandum in support of her motion on September 30, 1993, 
and again did not raise the issue regarding peremptory challenges. 
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On October 29, 1993, the court entered its Order Denying Plaintiffs Motion for 
Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict and Motion for New Trial based on the issues raised in 
plaintiffs motion. 
C. On November 12, 1993, plaintiff subsequently filed a Motion for Relief from 
Order Denying Plaintiffs Motion for New Trial pursuant to Rule 60(b). The memorandum filed 
in support of plaintiff s motion failed to acknowledge that the Motion NOV and for New Trial 
had not included a claim regarding peremptory challenges. Instead, as if attempting to amend 
her failed Rule 59 motion, plaintiff cited Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and 
for the first time noted Randle v. Allen. 862 P.2d 1332 (Utah 1993), arguing that the district 
court's original denial of plaintiffs5 Motion to Limit the Defendants' Peremptory Challenges was 
incorrect. 
D. On November 24, 1993, after considering the Randle decision and respective 
memoranda and oral argument, the trial court denied plaintiffs Rule 60(b) motion. (See. Order 
attached hereto as Exhibit MA,M R. 1036.2-1036.3.) The district court stated, orally and in its 
order, that it had found at the time of qualifying the jury that there was sufficient adversity 
between the defendants to justify granting each defendant separate peremptory challenges. 
The Court of Appeals failed to address the issue that the plaintiffs assertion of claimed 
error of the trial court was not timely raised under Rule 59 and that a motion under Rule 60(b) 
does not extend the time for appeal. See, Goddard v. Bundy. 241 P.2d 462 (Utah 1952). 
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The court has overlooked or misapprehended the following points of law and/or fact: 
POINT I 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The Court of Appeals' failure to address the procedural background caused it to 
incorrectly apply the standard of review. Instead of noting that "the trial court is afforded broad 
discretion in ruling on a motion for relief from judgment under Utah R.Civ.P. 60(b), and its 
determination will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion," Birch v. Birch. 771 P.2d 
1114, 1117 (Utah App. 1989), the court cites that "this appeal turns on the interpretation of Rule 
47 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and, thus, presents a question of law." See, Slip 
Opinion at 3. 
The recitation and application of the accurate standard of review is "central to the 
decision making of appellate courts (in that standards of review) set the power of the lens 
through which appellate judges examine each issue." Norman H. Jackson, Utah Standards of 
Appellate Review, Utah Bar Journal, October 1994, at 11. Whereas the Court of Appeals 
afforded the trial judge's rulings on plaintiffs Rule 59 and 60 motions "no deference," the 
correct standard of review of matters committed to the trial court's discretion is set forth in State 
v. Pena. 869 P.2d 932 (Utah 1994). In employing a pasture metaphor to characterize the 
spectrum of discretion granted to the trial court, the Utah Supreme Court explained, 
Only when the trial judge crosses an existing fence or when the appellate court 
feels comfortable in more closely defining the law by fencing off a part of the 
4 
pasture previously available does the trial judge's de.——. u_ u<x broad 
discretion granted. 
Id,, at 938. 
POINT 11 
THE ISSUE OF P E R E M P T O R Y CHALLENGES 
WAS NOT TIMELY RAISED 
Following the denial of plaintiff s Rule 59 motion, plain ~ >ub^v- nflv filed a Motion 
for Relief from the Order Denying the Muliun Un - -.-'•-;.,. s 
grounds therefor "a recent development and the law, speciikali} the Utah Supreme Court's 
ruling in Randle v. Allen." 
T".- *<•« rt + -^ - ;ue of peremptory challenges in her Rule 59 motion. 
She cannot under the JIC OU(0) extend the time for asking for a new trial based on 
perei iaiienges. 
The motion for relief from, the order denying her motion for a new trial cannot be based 
on grounds not asserted in tlu. motion lor new trial y i I J1" I ' V I in mi! In in in in ii in | ( T C S u f l i r t I ml in ( I n t r i a l 
court In the timely filed motion. 
The Rule 60(b) motion asked the trial court for relief from an order upon gi ounds not 
present ril li IL i.iii. ( II in pi nal motion. 
Although the Rules of Procedure are tc ,,L~ Hberally construed to secure the just . 
determinau ' may not extend the 
time for taking any action under Rules _ , except to the extent 
and under the conditions stated in them." Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 6(b). Hence, although 
a trial court has broad discretion in granting new trials, "its power is not without limitation and 
cannot be exercised capriciously or arbitrarily" and its actions must conform to established rules 
and procedures in Utah courts. Kettner v. Snow. 13 Utah 2d 382, 384 (1962). 
Rule 59(b) provides that "a motion for new trial shall be served not later than ten days 
after the entry of judgment." Although Rule 60(b) permits "a reasonable time" in which to make 
a motion for relief from judgment, when "an untimely motion is made, the trial court's only 
alternative is to deny the motion." Burgers v. Maiben. 652 P.2d 1320, 1321 (Utah 1982). The 
issue of what constitutes a reasonable time under Rule 60(b) is reserved to the trial court. As 
noted previously, this court recognizes that "the trial court is afforded broad discretion in ruling 
on a motion for relief from judgment under Utah R.Civ.P. 60(b), and its determination will not 
be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion." Birch v. Birch. 771 P.2d 1114, 1117 (Utah App. 
1989) (citations omitted). 
The trial court's decision to deny plaintiffs Rule 60(b) motion is consistent with 
precedent which establishes that Rule 60(b) may not be used to extend the time in which a 
motion may be filed pursuant to Rule 59. Goddard v. Bundy. 121 Utah 299, 310, 241 P.2d 462 
(1952). 
Deference to the trial court's judgment is particularly appropriate in this instance. 
Plaintiff first raised the issue of peremptory challenges in a pretrial motion to limit the number 
of peremptory challenges given each defendant and should have raised it in the Rule 59 motion 
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for a new trial if intending to rely upon it. Plaintiff may not avoid compliance with the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure solely upon the fortuitous timing of the Supreme Court's opinion in 
Randle v. Allen. Rather, failure to adhere to the time limits contained in the Rules amounts to 
a waiver of plaintiffs right to assert an attack based upon the number of peremptory challenges 
granted to the parties. 
It is possible that reasonable judges would reach different conclusions on plaintiffs 
motion, however, "this court will not substitute its judgment as between two reasonably 
conflicting views, even though we may have come to a different conclusion had the case come 
before us for de novo review." Grace Drilling Co. v. Board of Review. 776 P.2d 63, 68 (Utah 
App. 1989). In matters reserved for the trial court's discretion, the issue is whether the trial 
court may "reach one of several possible conclusions about the legal effect of a particular set 
of facts without risking reversal." Pena, supra, at 937. Of course, as previously noted, the 
power of the appellate court's reviewing "lens" is weakest where, as here, the trial court's 
determination is at the "extreme end of the spectrum." 
The Opinion of the Court of Appeals failed to address this untimely raising of the 
peremptory challenge issue. The raising of such issue in the trial court was beyond the 10 day 
time limit under Rule 59 and cannot be the basis of the appeal. This issue of timeliness and use 
of Rule 60(b) as the vehicle for assertion of the issue was not addressed by the Opinion of the 
Court of Appeals and entitles petitioners to a rehearing of this appeal. 
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POINT m 
THE DETERMINATION OF ADVERSENESS BETWEEN 
THE DEFENDANTS WAS A FACTC)XL DETERMINATION 
FOR THE TRIAL COURT 
In its Opinion, the court notes that "different 'sides' exists for purposes of Rule 47(e) if 
there is a 'substantial controversy' between co-parties 'respecting the subject matter of this 
suit.'" Slip Opinion at 5. The court subsequently presents a lengthy hypothetical before 
concluding that "such a scenario may well warrant separate sets of peremptory challenges to 
defendants." Slip Opinion at footnote 4. 
The court's statement of the law, coupled with its accompanying hypothetical, 
conclusively establishes that the determination of whether sufficient "adverseness" exists between 
the parties such as to warrant granting additional peremptory challenges must be a question of 
fact. The determination must be based on issues broader than the mechanical query of whether 
nominal defendants filed crossclaims. See, Sutton v. Otis Elevator. 68 Utah 85 (1926) 
(permitting peremptory challenges among multiple defendants although crossclaims were not 
filed). Instead, it is based on information gleaned from the entire proceedings and may include: 
(1) whether the parties employed the same attorneys; (2) whether separate answers were filed; 
(3) whether the parties interests were antagonistic. See, Carraro v. Wells Fargo Mtg. & Equity. 
744 P.2d 915, 918 (New Mexico App. 1987), Diamond Shamrock Corp. v. Wendt. 718 S.W.2d 
766, 768 (Texas App.-Corpus Christi 1986). In its order denying Plaintiffs Motion for Relief 
from Order Denying plaintiffs Motion for a New Trial Pursuant to Rule 60(b), the court 
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explain A, "ilu ,il lli" I• 11 • - I ll> hanmg in chambers on the motion to limit peremptory 
challenges, the court made findings at that time that there was sufficient adversity between the 
various defendants din I) filial Yk1i dcluklanl vv.ts nifitln! to sqianife peremptory challenges." 
(See. Order attached hereto as Exhibit "A," R 1036.2-1036.3.) Consequently, the trial court's 
determination of adversity between the parties, the basis loi h award ul' (<i»ui puvmpioiy 
challenges to each of the named defendants, should not be disturbed unless "the factual findings 
made by the trial court are not adequately supported by the record, resolving all disputes in the 
e1 it I rial court's determination." Pena, supra, at 935, 936, 
(citations omitted). 
The Opinion \A NIL1 < Viiif oi Appeals LulnJ lo address; this factual determination, the 
standard of review of such factual determination and why it was not in compliance with the 
Supreme Court decision in Randle. 
POINT IV 
THE COURT FAILED TO ADDRESS 
THE 14TH AMENDMENT ISSUE 
Appellee, Pro-Tech, in its brief on appeal asserted that the Supreme Court in Sutton and 
in Randle were never presented with the issue of equal protection und •. • :. 
In petliiiiCiil luiiiil, dial provision provides, 
No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or 
immunities of citizens of the United States nor shall deprive any person of life, 
liberty, or property without due process of law nor deny to any person within its 
jurisdiction equal protection of the laws. (Emphasis added.) 
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In issuing its Opinion, this court also overlooked and failed to address the fact that its 
interpretation of Rule 47(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure deprives the litigant of their 
right to equal protection under the 14th Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. As is more fully 
set out in appellee's brief, the court's application of Rule 47(c) effectively deprives some 
litigants of rights granted to other litigants in the same proceeding by providing certain parties 
only a share of peremptory challenges proportionate to the number of parties in the litigation, 
while allowing the opposing party its full number of peremptory challenges. 
In this instance, the adversity and hostility between Smith and Pro-Tech mandated 
appointment of separate counsel under the Rules of Professional Responsibility. By requiring 
Smith and Pro-Tech to share peremptory challenges, the court's ruling nevertheless prohibits 
defendants from enjoying the same protections of the laws afforded to plaintiff. 
POINT V 
THE COURT FAILED TO ADDRESS THE DUE 
PROCESS ISSUE UNDER THE 5TH AMENDMENT 
The court also overlooked the fact that the sharing of peremptory challenges potentially 
"puts it in the power of the plaintiff to deprive the real parties sought to be charged of the right 
to interpose even one peremptory challenge." Sutton v. Otis Elevator Co.. 68 Utah 85, 143 
(1926). To name a defendant in a suit, and then to deprive that defendants of the same right to 
challenge any of the jurors the plaintiff may exercise, is to deny due process to such defendant 
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iin'IiMliiifj llit1 PIJL'III (» fffcTiivc nsMsfatM'*1 <»< t'onnsol, in derogation of the 5th Amendment to the 
U.S. Constitution. 
POINT1 VI 
THE COURT FAILED TO ADDRESS THE 
ISSUES UNDER THE UTAH CONSTITUTION 
• The courl .thi incrliMikul lli.il ihr ii|i|ik'iilinii \A Rule 47(c) is unconstitutional under 
Article 1 § 24 of the Utah Constitution which provides "all laws of a general nature shall have 
uniform operation." As the operation of 1:1 le lav i i n ist be \ it rife i i i i, a la\ tl lat is si iperficially 
uniform may still be unconstitutional. Lee v. Gaufin. 867 P.2d 572 (Utah 1993) this 
instance, Rule 47(c) does not operate uniformly and is unconstitutional in th, il ii I reals «JcH:iiclai)ls 
differentlj tha i I plaintiff by allowing the plaintiff three peremptory challenges, yet requires 
defendants to share peremptory challenges. In issuing its Opinion, this court should consider 
the constitute u in other contexts. See, 
Greenwood v. City of North Salt Lake. 817 P.2d 816 (Utah 1991) (holding that a law must 
apply equally to all persons within a class); Malen v. Lewis. 984) 
(determining that the Utah automobile guest statute is unconstitutional under this section); 
Johnson v. Stoker. 685 P.2d 539 (Utah 1984) (holding that t yuesl statute is 
i ^stitutional under this section). 
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POINT VII 
THE COURT FAILED TO ADDRESS THE ISSUES 
RAISED BY SHARED PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES 
Finally, a strict rule requiring peremptory challenges to be shared would work injustice 
other than the federal and state constitutional violations. The court's interpretation overlooked 
the fact that the rights of either party, or of both parties, could be seriously jeopardized or 
entirely deprived in multi-party actions, if they cannot agree on peremptory challenges. For 
example, although in this instance plaintiff conceded that the rights of Pleasant Grove City were 
sufficiently disparate from the rights of Smith and Pro-Tech, the practical problem remains 
whether Smith or Pro-Tech receives all three peremptory challenges in the absence of an 
agreement between the parties or whether the rules require strict agreement among both parties 
before any of their peremptory challenges may be exercised. 
WHEREFORE, appellee prays that a rehearing be granted and that on rehearing this 
court's Opinion dated December 21, 1995, be withdrawn and the court enter a new opinion 
affirming the judgment of the trial court. 
DATED and signed this Y day of January, 1996. 
M. Dayle Jeffs / / / / 
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CERTIFICATE 
As counsel for appellee, I hereby certify that the foregoing Petition for Rehearing is not 
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DATED and signed this / day of January, 1996. 
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EXfflBIT "A 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
SHIRLEY CARRIER | 
ORDER 
Plaintiff, | 
vs. | 
PRO-TECH RESTORATION dba STONE | 
CARPETS, WILLIAM ROGER SMITH, and 
THE CITY OF PLEASANT GROVE, | Civil No. 910400680 
Defendants. | Judge Ray M. Harding 
This matter came before the Court on the plaintiffs Motion for Relief from Order 
Denying Plaintiffs Motion for a New Trial Pursuant to Rule 60(B), Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure and Motion for Expedited Hearing. The plaintiff was represented in the Court by 
Lynn C. Harris; defendant, Pro-Tech Restoration, was represented by M. Dayle Jeffs; 
defendant, William Roger Smith, was represented by Robert L. Moody; and the defendant, 
Pleasant Grove City, was represented by John M. Chipman. 
The Court having reviewed the memorandums in support of the motion and in opposition 
thereto, having heard the oral arguments of counsel for the respective parties, and having been 
fully advised in the premises now makes and enters the following: 
ORDER 
The Court noted that at the time of the hearing in chambers on the motion to limit 
peremptory challenges, the Court made findings at that time that there was sufficient adversity 
between the various defendants, that each defendant was entitled to separate peremptory 
challenges. Accordingly, the Court now, 
DENIES the Motion for Relief from Order Denying Plaintiffs Motion for New Trial. 
DATED AND SIGNED this day of November, 1993. 
Ray M. Harding 
103b * 
